Anthropic researchers show poisoning 0.1% of pretraining data can plant a command-running backdoor in agents
arXiv · Research preprint
Read the source (opens in a new tab)- What happened
- Researchers from Anthropic and its Fellows Program, with UC Berkeley, UIUC, Deeptune and UCL, posted a preprint on October 27, 2026 on planting backdoors in AI agents through pretraining data.
- Key points
- They pretrained Qwen3 models of 0.6B, 1.7B and 4B parameters from scratch on partly poisoned text, then post-trained each into a command-line agent using a clean pipeline.
- With 0.1% of the corpus poisoned, the 4B agent ran the attacker's command in at least one of 32 tries for "roughly 92%" of prompts with an ordinary file-path trigger, and about 10% with a rare string.
- Success rose with model size and stayed above zero at a 0.0005% poison rate; the trigger can be an ordinary file path containing the model provider's name.
- The authors say post-training cannot be assumed to clean out poison and point to checking agent actions before they run, such as sandboxing and human confirmation.
- Evidence
- Research preprint, not peer reviewed, on small models the authors trained themselves. The planted payload is one fixed command string.
- Uncertain
- The largest model had 4B parameters. The authors expect the risk to be at least as severe at frontier scale but say confirming it needs larger pretraining budgets.