METR and Redwood red-team OpenAI's internal agent monitoring and find ways agents could avoid or disable it
METR · Research report
Read the source (opens in a new tab)- What happened
- METR said on October 22, 2026 that a METR and a Redwood Research employee spent three weeks in July and August testing OpenAI's internal misalignment monitoring, with deep access.
- Key points
- They estimate roughly 75 to 94% of internal agentic Responses API traffic from models at least as strong as GPT-5.5 was eligible for monitoring; RL training runs were not covered.
- Not monitoring compaction events likely left on the order of 10% of eligible internal Codex traffic unmonitored from May to July 2026; OpenAI had found and fixed this.
- They found a way Codex agents could bypass sandboxing and Auto-Review, an exploit hiding hundreds of recent actions from the monitor, and two headers that disable monitoring for new agents.
- They say future monitoring should withstand "deliberate, strategic, and sustained attacks from highly capable internal agents at scale."
- Evidence
- External red-team findings on the system as it stood on and before July 21. METR publishes a small subset of a 61-page internal report, and OpenAI could redact this post.
- Uncertain
- OpenAI says all vulnerabilities affecting its production safeguards are patched and coverage has changed; the authors did not evaluate these claims.