Zenity Labs says one prompt to a public AWS AgentCore agent could expose every agent in the account and region
Zenity Labs · Research report
Read the source (opens in a new tab)- What happened
- Zenity Labs published AgentCorruption on October 8, 2026, a chain of flaws in Amazon Bedrock AgentCore that let a prompt to one exposed agent reach the credentials and data of every agent in the same AWS account and region.
- Key points
- An agent with any tool that makes outbound requests could be asked in plain language to fetch its cloud credentials from the instance metadata service, which the sandbox did not block.
- The default execution role was "badly overprivileged": with it the researchers could invoke other agents, "read all private conversations for all users and agents, poison memory and keep persistence," and harvest credentials and API keys.
- Zenity reported the findings to AWS in December 2025; AWS closed the report as "informative" on April 12, 2026, noting AgentCore had used IMDSv2 only since February 14, 2026, and Zenity says the issues "have been patched by the AWS security team."
- Evidence
- Security firm's own research write-up, the first of a series, with a disclosure timeline and AWS's statement. The findings are the researchers' account of their own test deployment.
- Uncertain
- AWS's statement in the post says "The behavior described is documented and expected" and that an agent reaches another account's resources only where a developer grants it; the two sides describe the same behavior differently. The post reports no exploitation beyond the researchers' own.