Epidemiologist Saskia Popescu writes that attention to AI biohazards is crowding out present biosecurity gaps
Nature · Comment
Read the source (opens in a new tab)- What happened
- In a Nature Comment marking 25 years since the US anthrax letters, University of Maryland epidemiologist Saskia Popescu wrote that the country "is no better prepared today."
- Key points
- She argues policymakers, researchers and the public focus on "overhyped biohazards, such as those designed by AI" at the expense of the most pressing risks, though "all these risks deserve attention."
- She accepts that AI "can reduce the amount of tacit knowledge that is required to make bioweapons," but quotes RAND's Barbara Del Castello that a digital design "still requires navigating steep physical and operational bottlenecks."
- Her named priorities are stronger safeguards on biological materials and equipment plus coordinated governance, with the warning that "voluntary industry action alone cannot substitute for independent oversight."
- Gaps she says get less attention: private labs of unknown number outside federal rules, US gain-of-function policy changed twice since 2025, and secure containment labs doubling since 2001 to "51 across 27 countries."
- Evidence
- An argument by a biosecurity researcher in a journal's comment section, not new data. It cites published analyses and reports of unregulated lab spaces that authorities found in Nevada and California.