Preprint argues current models increase biological weapons risk

arXiv · Research preprint

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What happened
Roger Brent and T. Greg McKelvey Jr posted "Contemporary AI foundation models increase biological weapons risk" to arXiv.
Key points
  • Argues safety assessments understate the risk by wrongly assuming bioweapons work needs "tacit knowledge" and by using benchmarks that miss uplift to skilled people as well as nonexperts.
  • The authors report that Llama 3.1 405B, ChatGPT-4o and Claude 3.5 Sonnet "accurately guide users through the recovery of live poliovirus from commercially obtained synthetic DNA."
  • Finds that "dual-use cover stories," in which a user misrepresents intent, "reliably bypass safeguards and guardrails" on all models tested.
  • Advocates improved benchmarks "while acknowledging the window for meaningful implementation may have already closed."
Evidence
RAND working paper (also on arXiv) that "has not been formally reviewed or edited." Findings rest on the authors' recorded dialogs with three models.
Uncertain
The accuracy of the models' guidance is the authors' own expert judgment; the paper reports no laboratory test of it.

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